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CONVERGENT LEARNING ALGORITHMS FOR UNKNOWN REWARD GAMES 
ARCHIE C. CHAPMAN†, DAVID S. LESLIE‡, ALEX ROGERS§, AND NICHOLAS R. JENNINGS¶
Abstract. Inthispaper, weaddresstheproblemofconvergencetoNashequilibriaingameswithrewardsthatare
initially unknown and must be estimated over time from noisy observations. These games arise in many real–world
applications, whenever rewards for actions cannot be prespeciﬁed and must be learnt on–line, but standard results
in game theory do not consider such settings. For this problem, we derive a multi–agent version of Q–learning to
estimate the reward functions using novel forms of the e–greedy learning policy. Using these Q–learning schemes
to estimate reward functions, we then provide conditions guaranteeing the convergence of adaptive play and the
better–reply processes to Nash equilibria in potential games and games with more general forms of acyclicity, and
of regret matching to the set of correlated equilibria in generic games. A secondary result is that we prove the strong
ergoditicity of stochastic adaptive play and stochastic better–reply processes in the case of vanishing perturbations.
Finally, we illustrate the efﬁcacy of the algorithms in a set of randomly generated 3-player coordination games,
and show the practical necessity of our results by demonstrating that violations to the derived learning parameter
conditions can cause the algorithms to fail to converge.
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1. Introduction. The design and control of large, distributed systems is a major engi-
neering challenge. In particular, in many scenarios, centralised control algorithms are not
applicable, because limits on the system’s computational and communication resources make
itimpossibleforacentralauthoritytohavecompleteknowledgeoftheenvironmentanddirect
communication with all of the system’s components [Jennings, 2001]. In response to these
constraints, researchers have focused on decentralised control mechanisms for such systems.
In this context, a class of noncooperative games called potential games [Monderer and
Shapley, 1996] have gained prominence as a design template for decentralised control in
the distributed optimisation and multi–agent systems research communities. Potential games
have long been used to model congestion problems on networks [Wardrop, 1952; Rosenthal,
1973]. However, more recently, they have been used to design decentralised methods of solv-
ing large–scale distributed problems, such as power control and channel selection problems
in ad hoc wireless networks [Scutari et al., 2006], task allocation, coverage and scheduling
problems [Arslan et al., 2007; Chapman et al., 2010] and distributed constraint optimisation
problems [Chapman et al., 2011]. In more detail, given a global target function, a potential
game is constructed by distributing the system’s control variables among a set of agents (or
players), and each agent’s reward function is derived so that it is aligned with the system–
wide goals. That is, an agent’s reward increases only if the global reward increases (as in
Wolpert and Tumer [2002]). If the agents’ rewards are perfectly aligned with the global tar-
get function, then the global target function is a potential for the game, which, in turn, implies
that the (pure) Nash equilibria of the game are local optima of the global target function.
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Given this framework for distributing an optimisation problem, the second problem fac-
ing a designer of a decentralised optimisation method is specifying a distributed algorithm for
computing a solution. This is addressed by the literature on learning in games; the dynamics
of learning processes in repeated games is a well investigated branch of game theory (see
Fudenberg and Levine [1998], for example). In particular, the results that are relevant to this
work are the guaranteed convergence to a Nash equilibrium in potential games of adaptive
play and the broad class of ﬁnite–memory better–reply processes [Young, 2004, 1993], and
of regret matching to correlated equilibrium [Hart and Mas-Colell, 2000, 2001]. Thus, de-
centralised solutions to an optimisation problem can be found by, ﬁrst, deriving a potential
game, and then using one of these algorithms to compute a Nash or correlated equilibrium.
There is, however, one major shortcoming to this model. As is standard in game theory,
there is an assumption that the value of each conﬁguration of variables, or the agents’ rewards
for different joint action proﬁles, is known from the outset. Although this is a sound assump-
tion in some domains, in many of the large, distributed control application domains to which
the decentralised control methods described above are targeted, it is not realistic to assume
that the rewards for different variable conﬁgurations can be prespeciﬁed. For example, in
many monitoring and coverage problems, the system’s task is to learn about the phenomena
under observation, but the rewards earned by the agents in the system are a function of the
phenomena detected, so cannot be known before they are deployed. Similarly, latencies on a
newly constructed or reconﬁgured ad–hoc network, which drive users’ routing policies, may
be initially unknown, and can be estimated only after observing the network’s trafﬁc ﬂows.
Against this background, we address the problem of distributed computation of equi-
libria in games with rewards that are initially unknown and which must be estimated online
from noisy observations. The algorithms derived allow agents to effectively learn their re-
ward functions while coordinating on an equilibrium. Because of their links to distributed
optimisation, we place particular focus on convergence to pure Nash equilibria in potential
games with unknown noisy rewards, but also derive an algorithm that converges to correlated
equilibrium in generic games. The adaptive processes we derive simultaneously perform: (i)
the recursive estimation of reward function means usingQ–learning [Sutton and Barto, 1998]
employing a novel greedy–in–the–limit–with–inﬁnite–exploration (GLIE) randomised learn-
ing policy [Singh et al., 2000] constructed for multi–agent problems, and (ii) the adjustment
to the strategies of others in the game using one of the learning processes enumerated above,
namely, adaptive play, better–reply processes, or regret matching.
Although Q–learning and the action adaptation processes above are well understood in-
dependently, the combined problem of learning the equilibria of games with unknown noisy
reward functions is less well understood, and it is this shortcoming that we address. Speciﬁ-
cally, the main theoretic results in this paper are:
1. We derive a novel multi–agent version of Q–learning with GLIE e–greedy learning
policies for which reward estimates converge to their true mean value. We use this
as a component of our novel action adjustment processes below.
2. As a preliminary step to our main results, we prove, for the ﬁrst time, the strong er-
godicityofstochasticadaptiveplayandbetter–replyprocesseswithvanishingchoice
perturbations in games with known rewards.
3. We prove the convergence of novel variants of adaptive play and the better–reply
processes, employing Q–learnt rewards and a GLIE e–greedy learning policy rule,
to Nash equilibrium in repeated potential games with unknown noisy rewards (and
in other more general classes of acyclic games speciﬁc to each process).
4. We prove the convergence of a novel variant of the regret matching algorithm, em-
ploying Q–learnt rewards and a GLIE e–greedy learning policy rule, to the set of3
correlated equilibrium in generic games with unknown noisy rewards.
One drawback of the Q–learning scheme we derive is that the size of the learning prob-
lem faced by the agents grows exponentially with the number of players, thereby reducing
the usefulness of our algorithms in large games. To tackle this, we provide similar results
to those above for games that can be encoded in two common compact graphical representa-
tions, graphical normal form and hypergraphical normal form [Kearns et al., 2001; Gottlob
et al., 2005; Papadimitriou and Roughgarden, 2008]. Speciﬁcally, we show how the sparse
interaction structure that these representations encode can be exploited to derive efﬁcient
exploration policies for Q–learning, such that the learning problem facing the agents is sig-
niﬁcantly reduced.
In addition to the main theoretical contribution of the paper, we empirically evaluate
the algorithms in a simple three player potential game with unknown noisy rewards. By so
doing, we seek to demonstrate the efﬁcacy of the algorithms in solving these problems, and
their advantages over other distributed methods previously proposed for these problems (such
as Claus and Boutilier [1998], Cominetti et al. [2010]). We also demonstrate the necessity of
the conditions on the learning parameters derived in our convergence results, by showing that
if they are violated, the algorithms are more likely to fail to converge.
The paper progresses as follows: The next section contrasts our contributions to exist-
ing work in the area of algorithms for games with unknown and/or noisy rewards. Section 3
covers the necessary game–theoretic background material and formally states the problem
addressed by the paper. In Section 4 we derive our multi–agent versions of Q–learning and
the e–greedy policy. Section 5 presents the main action adaptation process convergence re-
sults. Following these theoretical results, in Section 6 we compare the performance of the
algorithms in a test domain. Section 7 summarises the paper and discusses how our results
may be extended to further algorithms.
2. Related work. Several authors have previously tackled the problem of learning Nash
equilibria in games with unknown noisy rewards by applying Q–learning based approaches.
Most closely related to our work is that of Claus and Boutilier [1998], who specify a joint
action learner (JAL), in which each agent keeps track of the frequency of other agents’ ac-
tions, as in ﬁctitious play [Brown, 1951; Fudenberg and Levine, 1998; Leslie and Collins,
2006], while updating the reward estimate for the joint action played. However, the authors
do not provide convergence conditions for their algorithm, in that they do not investigate the
sampling probabilities required to ensure that the reward function estimates converge, nor do
they make the link between the convergence of these estimates and convergence of the actions
played to Nash equilibrium. Their investigation relies instead on experimental evidence of
convergence, and, furthermore, it is restricted to team games (games with a common payoff
function), whereas we consider several further classes of games. Additionally, other authors
consider independent action learners (IAL), in which agents use variants of the Q–learning
procedure independent of each other, oblivious of the effects of changes in other agents’
actions on their own payoffs. In particular, under the IAL processes of Claus and Boutilier
[1998], Leslie and Collins [2005] and Cominetti et al. [2010], the agents update their estimate
of the reward they receive for each of their actions, independent of the other agents, usingQ–
learning. These algorithms all use a Boltzmann distribution to select actions, but differ in the
speciﬁc manner in which this is used, with Claus and Boutilier [1998] specifying an annealing
schedule for the temperature coefﬁcient and Leslie and Collins [2005] and Cominetti et al.
[2010] using a constant temperature. However, none of these works prove convergence to
Nash equilibrium; indeed with a constant temperature it is impossible to generically achieve
convergence to Nash equilibrium. In Section 6, we demonstrate the superior performance of
our algorithms over the JAL and IAL processes discussed above.4
Single–agentlearninginunknownnoisygameenvironmentshasalsobeeninvestigatedin
the context of zero–sum games. In particular, Ba˜ nos [1968] considers two–player zero–sum
games, in which one agent does not know the payoffs and receives only a noisy observation of
the mean payoff for the action it plays each time a move is made. The author derives a class
of strategies for this player that perform as well asymptotically as if the player had known
the mean payoffs of the games from the outset. Auer et al. [1995] consider an adversarial
multi–armed bandit (MAB) problem, in which an adversary has control of the payoffs of
each of the MAB’s arms and aims to minimise the player’s payoff (these games contain the
zero–sum games studied by Ba˜ nos [1968] as a subclass). The authors provide an algorithm
for general multi–player games that asymptotically guarantees a player its maximin value.
For two–player zero–sum games, this is the same guarantee as the strategy derived by Ba˜ nos,
however the authors also show that their algorithm is more efﬁcient than that of Ba˜ nos. Both
of these approaches converge to a Nash equilibrium only in 2–player zero–sum games (where
the Nash equilibrium, minimax, and maximin concepts give the same solution). Thus, they
do not apply to multi–player and/or potential games.
Evolutionary approaches to learning in games with noisy reward functions have also
been investigated, which draw conclusions similar to ours regarding the long–run stability of
Nash equilibria. For example, Mertikopoulos and Moustakas [2010] consider a continuous–
time evolutionary learning procedure in a noisy game, reminiscent of JAL (discussed above),
and show that under this process, the game’s strict Nash equilibria is asymptotically stable.
Similarly, Hofbauer and Sandholm [2007] consider evolutionary better–reply learning in pop-
ulation games with noisy payoffs, and derive a process that converges to approximate Nash
equilibrium in stable games, potential games, and supermodular games.
Several algorithms have been proposed for games where agents cannot monitor their op-
ponents’ actions, so the payoffs that they receive appear to be randomised as the other play-
ers’ actions change. This is a different scenario to the situation we consider: agents’ payoffs
are corrupted by noise that is induced by their opponents’ unobservable switches in actions,
whereas our work considers noise in rewards that is caused by some exogenous random per-
turbation under the assumption that opponents’ actions can be observed. One approach to
games with unobservable actions is modiﬁed regret matching [Hart and Mas-Colell, 2000],
for situations where the agents do not know the payoffs and cannot observe their opponents’
actions. Asymptotic play of this algorithm is guaranteed to be in the set of correlated equi-
libria in all generic games. A second relevant approach to games with unknown rewards and
unobserved opponent actions is given in Marden et al. [2009], who investigate payoff–based
dynamics that converge to pure–strategy Nash equilibria in weakly acyclic games, one of
which, sample experimentation dynamics, can admit perturbations in agents’ rewards. This
algorithm alternates between two phases — exploration and exploitation. However, it re-
quires that several parameters are set in advance, which control the exploration phase length,
exploration rates, and tolerances on payoff difference and switching rates for deciding when
to change strategies. These parameters depend on the problem at hand, and if they are incor-
rectly set, then the algorithm may fail to converge. This means that a user must have sufﬁcient
a priori knowledge of the problem at hand or set them in a conservative manner, which slows
the rate of convergence.
The only algorithms proven to converge, in some sense, to a Nash equilibrium in all
games are the regret–testing algorithms of Foster and Young [2006] (see also Young [2009]).
These algorithms will stay near a Nash equilibrium for a long time once it has been reached,
but perform what is essentially a randomised exhaustive search to ﬁnd an equilibrium in
the ﬁrst place. We sacriﬁce this convergence in all games in order to improve the rate of
convergence in the games we are interested in (i.e. classes of games directly associated with5
distributed optimisation problems).
Finally, while our results rely on conditions for products of stochasitc matrices to be
strong ergodic derived by Anily and Federgruen [1987], we note that recent results by Touri
and Nedi´ c [2010] may also be employed to the same end.
3. Game theory preliminaries. This section covers noncooperative games, acyclicity
properties for games, and games with unknown and noisy rewards. Throughout, we use P()
to denote the probability of an event occurring.
3.1. Noncooperativegames. Weconsiderrepeatedplayofaﬁnitenoncooperativegame
G = hN;fAi;rigi2Ni, where N = f1;:::;ng is a set of agents, Ai is the set of actions of agent i,
and ri : i2NAi ! R is i’s reward function. Let A = i2NAi be the set of all joint actions (also
called outcomes), and a 2 A be a particular joint action. Agents can choose to play according
to a distribution over pure actions, si 2D(Ai), known as a mixed strategy, where each element
si(ai) is the probability i plays ai. The rewards of the mixed extension of the game are given
by the expected value of ri under the joint mixed strategy s 2 i2ND(Ai) over outcomes:
ri(s) = å
a2A
 
Õ
j2N
sj(aj)
!
ri(a): (3.1)
We use the notation a = (ai;a i), where a i is the joint action chosen by all agents other than
i and, similarly, s = (si;s i) where s i is the joint independent lottery. In this paper, we are
interested two solutions, namely Nash and correlated equilibrium.
DEFINITION 3.1. A joint strategy, s 2 i2ND(Ai), is a Nash equilibrium if it satisﬁes:
ri(s) ri(si;s
 i)  0 8 si 2 D(Ai); 8 i 2 N:
If there is no player, i, that is indifferent between s
i and another strategy (i.e. the inequality
above is strict), then s is a strict Nash equilibrium. All strict Nash equilibria are pure.
DEFINITION 3.2. A distribution y 2 D(A) is a correlated equilibrium if it satisﬁes:
å
a2A : ai6=k
y(a)(ri(a) ri(k;a i))  0 8 k 2 Ai; 8 i 2 N:
In a Nash equilibrium, every agent plays a best response to its opponents’ strategies; while in
a correlated equilibrium, every agent plays a best response to its opponents’ strategies condi-
tional on the correlating signal y, which, in a repeated game, may be the history of play. Note
that every Nash equilibrium is a correlated equilibrium with y a product distribution (i.e. no
correlation). Approximate d–Nash and d–correlated equilibria are deﬁned by replacing the
right hand side of the two expressions above with d>0. A ﬁnal technical deﬁnition is generic
games: G is generic if a small change to any single reward does not change the number or
location of the Nash equilibria of G. A sufﬁcient condition for G to be generic is that a player
is never indifferent between its pure actions. An important implication is that all pure Nash
equilibria in generic games are strict.
3.2. Acyclicity properties for games. This section outlines a hierarchy of acyclicity
properties for games. The ﬁrst property is characterised by constructing a best–reply graph
for a game G. This is a directed graph with vertices given by A, with an edge from a to a0
if and only if there is exactly one player i that changes its action (i.e. ai 6= a0
i and a i = a0
 i)
and a0
i = argmaxai2Ai(ri(ai;a i)). Note that a pure Nash equilibrium of G is found at a sink
of the best–reply graph, that is, a vertex with no outgoing edges. Next, a sequence of steps
(a0;a1;:::;at :::) is called a best–reply path in G if each successive pair at;at+1 is joined6
by an edge from at to at+1 in the best–reply graph. A game G is weakly acyclic under best
replies (or a WAG) if from every a 2 A, there exists a best–reply path that terminates in a
Nash equilibrium in a ﬁnite number of steps [Young, 1993]. In a WAG, for each a 2 A, let
La be the length of the shortest best–reply path from a to a pure Nash equilibrium, and let
LG = maxa2ALa; we will need this constant in relation to the adaptive play algorithms.
A second, broader class is characterised by a similarly constructed better–reply graph
for G. Again, this is a directed graph with vertices A, but with an edge from a to a0 if and only
if ai 6= a0
i and a i = a0
 i and the change causes i’s reward to improve: ri(a0
i;a i) > ri(ai;a i).
As for the best–reply graph, pure Nash equilibria are found at the sinks of the better–reply
graph of G. A better–reply path is a sequence (a0;a1;:::;at :::) such that each successive pair
is joined by a directed edge in the better–reply graph. A game G such that from every a 2 A
there exists a better–reply path that terminates in a sink in a ﬁnite number of steps is called a
weakly acyclic under better replies game (WABRG) [Young, 2004].
A third form of acyclicity is characterised using a potential function. A potential, f(a), is
a function specifying the participants’ joint preference over A [Monderer and Shapley, 1996],
such that the difference in the potential induced by a unilateral change of action equals the
change in the deviator’s reward:
f(ai;a i) f(a0
i;a i) = ri(ai;a i) ri(a0
i;a i) 8 ai; a0
i 2 Ai; 8a i 2 A i:
A game that admits such a function is called a potential game (PG).1 Importantly, local
optima of the f(a) are Nash equilibria of G (analogous to the sinks of the best– or better–
reply graph); that is, the potential is locally maximised by myopic self–interested players.
In order to highlight the connections to distributed optimisation, assume now that f(a)
represents the systems’ global objectives. If the players’ rewards are perfectly aligned with
f(a) (i.e. an increase in a player’s reward improves the system reward by the same amount),
then f(a) is a potential for the game. Thus, the game’s pure Nash equilibria are local optima
of the global target function.
In summary, the key relationships between the classes above are given by: PGWAG
WABRG [Monderer and Shapley, 1996; Young, 2004]. We will refer to these classes of
games in Section 5 when considering our Q–learning algorithm variants.
3.3. Games with unknown noisy rewards. We now introduce the model of rewards
received in a repeated learning situation that will be studied in the rest of this article. Much
work on learning in games either assumes that the reward functions ri are known in advance
[e.g. Hart and Mas-Colell, 2000], or that the observed rewards are deterministic functions of
the joint action selected [e.g Rosenthal, 1973; Cominetti et al., 2010]. However, as argued in
Section 1, a more realistic scenario is that the observed rewards are noisy, and comprise of
an expected value equal to the unknown underlying reward function ri(a) and a zero–mean
random perturbation. We call this scenario unknown noisy rewards. This situation therefore
requires the individuals to estimate their underlying reward functions, while also adapting
their strategies in response to the actions of other agents.
DEFINITION 3.3. A game with unknown noisy rewards is a game in which, when the
joint action a 2 A is played, agent i receives the reward
Ri = ri(a)+ei (3.2)
1Potential games include team games, in which agents have the same reward function, which are often studied in
distributed optimisation and artiﬁcial intelligence [e.g. Claus and Boutilier, 1998; Chapman et al., 2011]. Note that
the team models here are built from the ground up, rather than imposed on existing agents with private motivations.
This is a key point of difference from classic economic results on team decision–making, such as the works of
Marschak and Radner [1972] and Groves [1973].7
where ri(a) is the true expected reward to agent i from joint action a 2 A, and ei is a random
variable with expected value 0 and bounded variance.
To avoid unnecessary over–complication in this article, we assume that each realisation
of each ei is independent of all other random variables.2 Note that a game with unknown
noisy rewards is a generalisation of the bandit problem discussed by Sutton and Barto [1998],
and we shall use similar reinforcement learning strategies to estimate the values of ri().
3.4. Problem deﬁnition. We are now in a position to precisely describe the problem
which we address. We imagine a game with unknown noisy rewards which is repeated over
time. On each play of the game, the individuals select an action, receive rewards as per (3.2),
and also observe the actions selected by the other players. Based on this information, the
individuals update their estimates of the reward functions and adapt their actions.
For this scenario, we are interested in the evolution of strategies and, in particular,
whether actions converge to equilibrium. Moreover, in the speciﬁc case of a potential game
corresponding to a distributed optimisation problem, we want to prove convergence to Nash
equilibrium, thereby providing a distributed method of computing (locally) optimal joint
strategies with only noisy evaluations of the target function.
4. Convergence of reward function estimates using Q–learning. In this section we
show that, in a game with unknown noisy rewards, agents can form estimates of the true
reward functions that are sufﬁciently accurate to ensure that a Nash equilibrium can be found.
In noisy environments, reinforcement learning is often used to estimate the mean value of
a perturbed reward function [Sutton and Barto, 1998], so this is the method we adopt here.
In particular, if the agents update their estimates of the expected rewards for joint actions
using Q–learning, and select actions using an appropriate e–greedy action selection policy,
then with probability 1 the reward function estimates will converge to their true mean values.
Now, Q–learning can be applied independently by each player of a game, who learns the
expected reward for each action ai 2 Ai, ignoring the actions selected by the other agents
(see Section 2). However this can result in very slow adaptation of actions towards Nash
equilibrium. Instead, in this paper, we allow the learning of reward functions of joint actions,
and simultaneous explicit reasoning about the action selection of the other agents. This is
the JAL approach suggested (without analysis) in the context of ﬁctitious play by Claus and
Boutilier [1998]. The learning scheme we derive here will be used by all of the algorithms
considered in Section 5.
In particular, we consider a multi–agent version of Q–learning for single–state prob-
lems, in which the agents select a joint action and each receives an individual reward. This
algorithm operates by each individual recursively updating an estimate of its value of a joint
action a. Speciﬁcally, after playing action at
i, observing actions at
 i, and receiving reward Rt
i,
each individual i updates estimates Qt
i using the equation:
Qt+1
i (a) = Qt
i(a)+l(t)Ifat = ag
 
Rt
i  Qt
i(a)

8a 2 A: (4.1)
where the indicator Ifat = ag takes value 1 if at = a and 0 otherwise, and l(t) 2 (0;1) is a
learning parameter. In general, Qt
i(a) ! E[Rt
ijat = a] with probability 1 if the conditions:
¥
å
t=1
l(t)Ifat = ag = ¥ and
¥
å
t=1
(l(t))2 < ¥ (4.2)
2We believe that this assumption can be signiﬁcantly relaxed without comprising our results, but requires sig-
niﬁcant effort to explain how estimation is adapted to handle correlated errors, which is beyond the scope of this
paper.8
hold for each a 2 A [Jaakkola et al., 1994]. This can be achieved, under the condition that all
Qi(a) are updated inﬁnitely often, if:
l(t) =
 
Cl+#t(a)
 rl (4.3)
where Cl > 0 is an arbitrary constant, rl 2 (1=2;1] is a learning rate parameter, and #t(a) is
the number of times the joint action a has been selected up to time t. We use the form of
fl(t)gt1 given by (4.3) in the remainder of the paper.
The condition that all actions a are played inﬁnitely often can be met with probability
1 by using a randomised learning policy, in which the probability of playing each action
is bounded below by a sequence that tends to zero sufﬁciently slowly as t becomes large.
Furthermore, this learning policy can be chosen so that it is greedy in the limit, in that the
probability with which it selects maximal reward actions tends to 1 as t ! ¥. Such policies
are called greedy in the limit with inﬁnite exploration (GLIE) [Singh et al., 2000].
One common GLIE policy is known as e–greedy, and the results derived in this paper
depend on the use of this particular rule. Under this policy, an agent selects a greedy action at
time t with probability (1 e(t)) (although note that we have not yet deﬁned what a greedy
action should be in this context), and chooses an action at random with probability e(t). In
the single agent case, if, for example, e(t) = c=t with 0 < c < 1, then for any a:
¥
å
t=1
P(at = a) 
¥
å
t=1
e(t)
jAj
=C
¥
å
t=1
1
t
= ¥;
and so with probability 1 each action is selected inﬁnitely often [Singh et al., 2000].
In contrast to single agent settings, in multi–player games, the choice of joint action is
made by the independent choices of more than one agent. As such, for each Q–value to
be updated inﬁnitely often, the schedule fe(t)gt!¥ that the sampling sequence follows must
reﬂect the fact that the agents cannot explicitly coordinate to sample speciﬁc joint actions.
LEMMA 4.1. In a game with unknown noisy rewards, if agents select their actions using
a learning policy in which, for all i 2 N, ai 2 Ai and t  1,
P(at
i = ai)  ei(t); with ei(t) = cet 1=jNj;
where ce > 0 is a positive constant, then 8i 2 N, 8a 2 A,
lim
t!¥
jQt
i(a) ri(a)j = 0 with probability 1. (4.4)
Proof. If the probability that agent i selects an action is bounded below by ei(t) =
cet 1=jNj, then the probability that any joint action a is played is bounded below by:

cet 1=jNj
jNj
= (ce)jNjt 1:
Since å
¥
t=0(ce)jNjt 1 = ¥, by a generalised Borel–Cantelli lemma [Jaakkola et al., 1994],
with probability 1 each joint action a 2 A is selected inﬁnitely often, and the result follows.
This may result in a practical learning procedure if jNj is sufﬁciently small. However,
in large games, visiting each joint action inﬁnitely often is an impractical constraint. To
achieve sufﬁciently high exploration rates through independent sampling, as in the e–greedy
approach, would require the agents’ e sequences to decrease so slowly that in any practical
sense the agents will never move into an exploitation phase. To address this limitation, in
AppendixAweconsidersparsegamesinwhicheachagentinteractsdirectlywithonlyasmall
number of other agents, such that the number of reward values each individual estimates can
be signiﬁcantly reduced. Here, however, we now move on to the main results of the paper.9
5. Action adjustment process with learnt reward functions. In this section, we con-
sider the convergence to Nash equilibria of adaptive play and better–reply processes with
inertia, and of regret matching to the set of correlated equilibrium, using the Q–learning ap-
proaches described above. Speciﬁcally, for the ﬁrst two classes of algorithm, we show that
if the agents (i) update their estimates of the expected rewards for joint actions using Q–
learning, (ii) update their beliefs over their opponents’ actions using an appropriate action
adjustment algorithm, and (iii) select a new action using an appropriate e–greedy learning
policy, then their actions converge to a Nash equilibrium in potential games with unknown
noisy rewards. For regret matching, we show that if the same conditions hold, then the agents’
action frequencies converge to the set of correlated equilibria in all generic games. The ﬁrst
part of this section comprises a brief recap of Markov chains, before the three subsequent
sections cover the main results of the paper for each of the algorithms listed above.
5.1. Markov chain basics. Our approach is to consider the ergodicity properties of
Markov chains induced by time–inhomogeneous versions of adaptive play and better–reply
processes with inertia. We then show that Q–learning variants of the processes eventually
behave as if the reward functions have been correctly learnt, so that the same convergence
results follow. We begin by recalling some deﬁnitions from Markov chain theory.
Consider a nonstationary Markov chain fX0;X1;X2;:::g on a ﬁnite state space X, with
a sequence of transition matrices fP(t)gt1 such that P(Xt+1 = yjXt = x) = (P(t))xy. Ergod-
icity of this chain corresponds to properties of the products P(s;t) = Õ
t
t=sP(t). Following
Isaacson and Madsen [1976] we distinguish between weakly ergodic chains, where the effect
of the initial state vanishes (i.e. the rows of P(s;t) are near to identical for sufﬁciently large
t), and strongly ergodic chains, which converge to a steady state distribution (i.e. all rows of
P(s;t) converge to a ﬁxed distribution).
DEFINITION 5.1. A nonstationary Markov chain is weakly ergodic if, for all s  1, a
sequence of vectors µ(s;t) exist such that
lim
t!¥

P(s;t)xy µ(s;t)y

= 0 8 x;y 2X: (5.1)
A nonstationary Markov chain is strongly ergodic if a steady state distribution µ exists such
that, for all s  1,
lim
t!¥

P(s;t)xy µy

= 0 8 x;y 2X: (5.2)
Anily and Federgruen [1987] demonstrate how to show that a Markov chain with a con-
verging sequence of transition matrices satisﬁes these ergodicity properties. This, in turn,
can be used to show that as t gets large, the distribution of Xt is approximately equal to the
distribution that is the limit of the stationary distributions of the transition matrices P(t). We
will show that our learning processes generate a strongly–ergodic Markov chain with a con-
verging transition matrix sequence, for which the limiting stationary distribution places all of
its mass on the pure Nash equilibria of the game.
5.2. Q–learning adaptive play. For both Q–learning adaptive play and better–reply
processes with inertia, each agent possesses a ﬁnite memory of length m, recalling the history
of the previous m actions taken by its opponents. Let h be a joint history of length m, where
h = (at m;:::;at 1), and let H of size jAjm be the collection of all the possible joint histories.
After observing an action proﬁle at, the joint history conﬁguration moves from h to h0 by
removing the left–most element of h and adjoining at as the right–most element of h0. A
successor to h is any history h0 2 H that can be obtained in this way. For example, imagine10
a two–player game with A1 = fa;bg and A2 = fA;Bg. Let m = 2 and set h = (aA;aA); the
successors to h are h0 2 f(aA;aA);(aA;bA);(aA;aB);(aA;bB)g. Note that in the ﬁrst m plays
of the game there will not be a full memory; since the whole point of the proofs is that the
starting point is forgotten we do not address this issue here (one could assume that an arbitrary
initial history is selected, for example).
DEFINITION 5.2 (Adaptive play [Young, 1993]). At each time–step, each agent samples
k  m of the elements of its memory of length m, and plays a best response to the actions in
the sample.
If k  m=(LG +2), then adaptive play converges to a Nash equilibrium in games that
are weakly acyclic under best replies (WAGs) [Theorem 1, Young, 1993]. We consider the
(stationary) Markov chain on the state space H generated by adaptive play. Let pi(aijh) be the
best–reply distribution for agent i, with pi(aijh) > 0 only if there exists a sample of length k
from h to which ai is a best reply for i. Then, if a is the right–most element of h0, a successor
to h, the probability of moving from h to h0 is:
P0
hh0 =Õ
i2N
pi(aijh); (5.3)
while if h0 is not a successor to h, then P0
hh0 = 0. The convergence proved by Young is that
this Markov process converges to an absorbing state, and each absorbing state is a history
consisting entirely of one strict Nash equilibrium.
However for Q–learning variants we have seen that it is important to play all (joint) ac-
tions inﬁnitely often. Therefore we consider a perturbation, which we call uniform sampling,
applied to the adaptive play process. We begin by considering the simpler case of games with
known rewards, before extending the analysis to unknown noisy rewards.
DEFINITION 5.3 (Stochastic adaptive play). At each time–step, each agent acts indepen-
dently and uses the (unperturbed) adaptive play rule with probability 1 e(t), or uniformly
samples from Ai with probability e(t).
For e(t) = e ﬁxed, this process is considered by Young [1993]. The transition matrix of
stochastic adaptive play at time t with perturbations e(t) is Pe(t), where Pe has hh0 entry
Pe
hh0 = (1 e)
jNjP0
hh0 + å
KN; K6=/ 0
ejKj(1 e)
jNj jKjUK
hh0 (5.4)
where
UK
hh0 =
8
> > <
> > :
Õ
i2K
1
jAij
Ifa0
i = aigÕ
i= 2K
pi(a0
ijh)
if h is a successor to h0 and ai (resp. a0
i) is
the ith entry of the right–most element of h
(resp. h0); and
0 otherwise.
Clearly, if e(t) = e for all t then we have a stationary, irreducible and aperiodic Markov chain
on a ﬁnite state space, which is then both weakly and strongly ergodic; denote the unique
stationary distribution of Pe by µe; this result tells us that P(ht = h) ! µe
h as t ! ¥.
Young’s analysis of this process considers stochastic stability of states h; a state h is
called stochastically stable with respect to a family of processes Pe if lime!0µe
h > 0. Theo-
rem 2 of Young [1993] states that the stochastically stable states of stochastic adaptive play
with ﬁxed e are the histories consisting entirely of a single strict Nash equilibrium in generic
WAGs. One trivial implication of this result is that for any d, for sufﬁciently small ﬁxed e>0,
limt!¥P(at is a strict Nash equilibrium) > 1 d.
It is also clear that with a ﬁxed e, all joint actions will be played inﬁnitely often, so
the Q–learned estimates of joint action rewards will converge (in particular the conditions of
Lemma 4.1 are trivially satisﬁed). Hence we can consider the following process:11
DEFINITION 5.4 (Q–learning adaptive play). At each time–step, actions are selected
according to Deﬁnition 5.3, with best responses calculated with respect to joint action reward
estimates that are updated according to (4.1) with fl(t)gt1 following (4.3) withCl > 0 and
rl 2 (1=2;1].
Since the reward estimates converge almost surely, the following is straightforward:
LEMMA 5.5. Let G be a WAG with unknown noisy rewards and k  m=(LG+2). For any
d > 0 there exists an e > 0 such that, under Q–learning adaptive play with ﬁxed e, for all
sufﬁciently large t, P(at is a strict Nash equilibrium) > 1 d.
Proof. Note that the only difference from standard stochastic adaptive play is that the best
responses are calculated using the estimated Q–values instead of the true rewards. However
since the reward functions are bounded in absolute value, the game is generic, and the action
spaces and memory are ﬁnite, there exists an h > 0 such that if for all i 2 N, and for all a 2 A,
jQt
i(a) ri(a)j < h; (5.5)
then the best responses are the same whether the individuals use ri or Qt
i.
We know that (4.4) holds, so that with probability 1 there exists a T < ¥ such that for all
t  T (5.5) holds. It follows that, after T time–steps the actions of agents evolve exactly as
if they were using ri instead of Qt
i. Hence the result follows immediately from the result on
standard stochastic adaptive play.
However, we do not need to consider ﬁxed e(t), and with decreasing e(t) we do not need
topre–guessa“suitablysmall”value. Wewillshowthataschedulesimilartothatrequiredfor
Lemma 4.1 also implies suitable ergodicity properties of stochastic adaptive play. Combining
this result with the technique of Lemma 5.5 will give our result.
LEMMA 5.6. Let G be a generic WAG. Consider stochastic adaptive play with e(t) =
ct 1=mN. If k  m=(LG+2) then limt!¥P(at is a Nash equilibrium) = 1.
Note that the e schedule above is slightly different to that for Lemma 4.1; however, if e(t)
satisﬁes the conditions here then it necessarily satisﬁes those of Lemma 4.1.
Proof. This result is proved in three steps, ﬁrst showing that the process is weakly er-
godic, second, that it is strongly ergodic, and third, that the distribution of histories converges
to µ = lime!0µe, with the consequence that in generic WAGs, lime!0µe
h > 0 only if h con-
sists only of a single pure Nash equilibrium.
Weak ergodicity is proved by examining the ergodic coefﬁcients of the sequence of ma-
trices fPe(t)(t)gt1. The ergodic coefﬁcient of any stochastic matrix P, denoted erg(P), is
given by:
erg(P) = min
xy å
w
min(Pxw;Pyw):
By Theorem V.3.2 from Isaacson and Madsen [1976], the nonstationary process fPe(t)(t)gt1
is weakly ergodic if the product Pe(1)(1)Pe(2)(2) can be divided into blocks of matrices:
Pe(1)(1)Pe(2)(2) = [Pe(1)(1)Pe(t1)(t1)][Pe(tk+1)(tk +1)Pe(tk+1)(tk+1)]
= Pe(1;t1)(1;t1)Pe(tk+1;tk+1)(tk +1;tk+1)
such that:
¥
å
k=0
erg

Pe(tk;tk+1 1)(tk;tk+1 1)

= ¥ where t0 = 1: (5.6)12
Stochastic adaptive play is shown to satisfy (5.6) by considering blocks of length m.3 Let
Õi2N ei(t) =Ct 1=m be the minimum probability that any joint action is played at time–step t.
Consider blocks of length m, such that tk = f1;m+1;2m+1:::g, and observe that any state
h0 can be reached from an initial state h by an appropriate sequence of m random samples,
which occurs with least probability Õ
(k+1)m
t=km+1Ct 1=m. Evaluating (5.6) then gives:
¥
å
k=0
erg(Pe(tk;tk+m)(tk;tk+m)) 
¥
å
k=0
(k+1)m
Õ
t=km+1
Ct 1=m >Cm
¥
å
k=0

((k+1)m) 1=m
m
= ¥:
Thus, stochastic adaptive play with ei(t) =Ct 1=Nm is weakly ergodic.
We now prove that stochastic adaptive play is strongly ergodic, by showing that it meets
theconditionsofTheorem2ofAnilyandFedergruen[1987], whichgivesthesufﬁcientcondi-
tions for a weakly–ergodic nonstationary Markov chain to be strongly ergodic. This involves:
(i) constructing an extension ¯ e(x) of the sequence fe(t)gt1; (ii) constructing a regular ex-
tension ¯ P¯ e(x)(x) of the nonstationary process Pe(t)(t); and (iii) showing that all entries of the
regular extension ¯ P¯ e(x)(x) are members of a closed class of asymptotically monotone func-
tions.
DEFINITION 5.7. Let fa(t)gt1 be a sequence with a(t) 2 Rm for some m  1. The
function ¯ a(x) : (0;1] ! Rm is an extension of the sequence if ¯ a(xt) = a(t) for some sequence
fxtgt1, with limt!¥xt = 0.
To construct an extension of the sequence of sampling probabilities given in the state-
ment of Lemma 5.6, let ¯ e() be a vector function whose ith component is given by: ¯ ei(x) =
cx
1=Nl 8i 2 N. To verify this, set xt =t 1 so that xt 2 (0;1] for all t  1, limt!¥xt = 0, and the
ith component of ¯ e() evaluated at xt gives: ¯ ei(xt) = cx
1=Nl = c(t 1)
1=Nl = ei(t).
DEFINITION 5.8. Let ¯ P()beanextensionofanonstationaryMarkovchainfPe(t)(t)gt1:
¯ P() is said to be a regular extension of fPe(t)(t)gt1 if there exists a x 2 R++ such that the
collection of all subchains of ¯ P(x) is identical for all x < x.
Let ¯ P¯ ei(x)(x) be an extension to the Markov chain generated by stochastic adaptive play.
This is regular if the set f(h;h0) : ¯ P
¯ ei(x)
hh0 (x) > 0g is identical for all x < x.
In the setting of known rewards, the values P0
hh0 and QK
hh0 are independent of x (or t),
so the ﬁrst term on the right–hand side of (5.4) is positive for all x if and only if P0
hh0 > 0,
3In contrast, if l < m transitions are considered, it is always possible to pick two starting states h and g such
that the set of reachable states from both h and g after l transitions is empty. Thus, for every column of the as-
sociated l–step transition matrix, Pe(t;t+l)(t;t +l), if l < m, one or the other rows’ entry is 0, so its ergodic co-
efﬁcient is also 0. For example, consider a two–player game with A1 = fa;bg and A2 = fA;Bg and rewards
ri(a;A) = ri(b;B) = 1 and ri(a;B) = ri(b;A) = 0 for both players i = f1;2g. Let both adjust their actions using
stochastic adaptive play with m = 2. Now imagine two copies of this process, one starting at h = (aA;aA) and the
other at g = (bBbB), where these starting points are chosen to contain no entries in common. The successors to h
are h0 = f(aA;aA);(aA;bA);(aA;aB);(aA;bB)g, while for g they are g0 = f(bB;aA);(bB;bA);(bB;aB);(bB;bB)g,
so h0 \g0 = / 0, The one–step state transition probabilities are given in the following rows of the transition matrix:
aA, bA, aA, bA, aB, bB, aB, bB, aA, bA, aA, bA, aB, bB, aB, bB,
aA aA bA bA aA aA bA bA aB aB bB bB aB aB bB bB
aA,
(1 e)2 0 (1 e)e 0 0 0 0 0 e(1 e) 0 e2 0 0 0 0 0 aA
. . .
. . .
. . .
bB, 0 0 0 0 0 e2 0 (1 e)e 0 0 0 0 0 e(1 e) 0 (1 e)2
bB
All column–wise minimums of these two rows are 0, so the ergodic coefﬁcient of the one–step transition matrix is
0. It may be the case that the state space of the chain for a speciﬁc game may be reduced, but we can say no more
in general terms without knowing the game’s rewards; which are what the players are trying to estimate. Only by
considering blocks of length m or greater can this be avoided.13
and similarly, the second term of (5.4) is positive for all x whenever QK
hh0 > 0. Thus, setting
x = 1, we see that the set of transitions through the memory conﬁguration space with strictly
positive probabilities is identical for all x < x.
Having constructed and veriﬁed a regular extension to Pe(t)(t), in order to prove that
stochastic adaptive play is strongly ergodic, we are now left to show that every entry function
in ¯ P¯ ei(x)(x) belongs to a closed class of asymptotically monotone functions F .
DEFINITION 5.9. A class F  C1 of functions deﬁned on (1;0] is a closed class of
asymptotically monotone (CAM) functions if: (i) f 2 F ) f0 2 F and  f 2 F; (ii) f;g 2
F ) (f +g) 2 F and (f g) 2 F; and (iii) all f 2 F change signs ﬁnitely often in on (0;1].
DEFINITION 5.10. Let F be the class of real valued functions such that every f 2 F is
of the form å
K
k=1(Vk(x))
1=ck, with ck a given integer (including negatives) and Vk() a given
polynomial function that is positive on (0;1].
Observe that the class F is CAM on (0;1] (although not necessarily everywhere on R).
Regarding Pe(t)(t), in the ﬁrst term of (5.4), the product Õi2N(1 cet 1=Nlx) is a member of
F , as are the two products in the second term. Thus, all elements of the transition matrix of
stochastic adaptive play are functions in the class F . Therefore, stochastic adaptive play is
strongly ergodic.
Finally, we characterise the supports of µ by combining Theorem 2 of Young [1993]
and these ergodicity properties. Speciﬁcally, Theorem 2 of Anily and Federgruen [1987]
states that if a nonstationary Markov process is strongly ergodic, then for large enough
t, each transition matrix Pe(t)(t) is associated with a steady state distribution over actions
µe(t)(t) with limt!¥µe(t)(t) = µ and limt!¥P
(s;t)
hh0 = µ
h0 for all h;h0 2 H, s  1. Theo-
rem 2 of Young [1993] tells us that µ puts mass only on the stochastically stable states,
which in generic WAGs are a subset of the strict Nash equilibria. Therefore limt!¥P(ht 2
stochastically stable states of G) = 1, and since the unique best reply to a strict Nash equilib-
rium is to continue playing the same, the result follows.
Note that the players will move between strict Nash equilibria — that is the meaning of
ergodicity in this context — but will spend increasingly long durations of play at one strict
Nash equilibrium as e ! 0.
THEOREM 5.11. Let G be a game with unknown noisy rewards with mean rewards
that are a generic WAG (a noisy generic WAG). Consider Q–learning adaptive play with
e(t) = ct 1=mN. If k  m=(LG+2) then limt!¥P(at is a Nash equilibrium) = 1.
Proof. The proof follows exactly the same logic as Lemma 5.5. After an almost surely
ﬁnite time T the reward estimates will be sufﬁciently close to the true mean rewards that
Q–learning adaptive play will make action selections with exactly the same probabilities as
a stochastic adaptive play. Hence the result follows from Lemma 5.6.
5.3. Q–learning better–reply processes with inertia. We now examine Q–learning
better–reply processes with inertia.
DEFINITION 5.12 (Better–reply processes with inertia [Young, 2004]). At each time
step, with probability xi an agent plays the same action as in the previous time step, at
i =at 1
i ,
while with probability 1 xi the agent selects an action according to a distribution that puts
positive probability only on actions that are better replies to its full memory of length m than
at 1
i .
By Theorem. 6.2 of Young [2004], if G is generic and weakly acyclic under better replies
(a generic WABRG) and each 0 < xi < 1 for all i 2 N, then the unperturbed better–reply
processes with inertia converges almost surely to a homogeneous state consisting of one strict
Nash equilibrium of G. Any algorithm that selects from the set of better replies to its (full,
undiscounted) memory falls into this class of algorithms. Accordingly, it is a large class
of algorithms that includes those that choose actions based on either their expected reward14
(i.e. an improvement in expected reward over the current action), such as the better–response
dynamics of Friedman and Mezzetti [2001] and the evolutionary–inspired process of Kandori
et al. [1993], or based on regrets computed from a ﬁnite memory, as in Young [2004]. Like
adaptive play, the better–reply processes with inertia generates a Markov chain on a state
space H. Now let pi(aijh) be the better–reply distribution used by agent i, with pi(aijh) > 0
only if ai is a better reply to h for i. Let L  N be a set of players having inertia and choosing
not to update their action at the current time–step. The Markov process transition function
for a ﬁnite memory better–reply process with inertia, given a vector of inertial constants
x = fx1;:::;xng, is then given by:
P0
hh0 =Õ
i2N
(1 xi)pi(aijh)+ å
LN; L6=/ 0
 
Õ
i2L
xi
! 
Õ
i= 2L
(1 xi)
!
IL
hh0 (5.7)
where
IL
hh0 =
8
> > <
> > :
Õ
i2L
Ifa0
i = aigÕ
i= 2L
pi(a0
ijh)
if h is a successor to h0 and ai (resp. a0
i) is the
ith entry of the right–most element of h (resp.
h0); and
0 otherwise.
The ﬁrst term in (5.7) is the product of the transition probability of the ﬁnite memory better–
reply process without inertia and the probability that no agent has inertia, while the second
term captures the probabilities of transitions arising from all partitions of the agents into those
that do have inertia (L) and those that playing according to the unperturbed dynamics (NnL).
Note that although this looks likethe stochastic adaptive play transition function, this is in fact
the unperturbed dynamics of the better–reply process. We will introduce experimentation as
well, to ensure sufﬁcient exploration of the joint action space.
We can analyse stochastic better–replies with inertia in an identical way to the earlier
treatment of stochastic adaptive play. Speciﬁcally, substitute P0
hh0(t) from (5.7) into (5.4) and
also treat pi(aijh) as the better–reply distribution for agent i deﬁned earlier in this section.
This gives the perturbed transition probability for stochastic better–replies with inertia, which
looks identical to (5.4) but has different values P0
hh0(t) and pi(aijh). Adding uniform sampling
leads to the following deﬁnition.
DEFINITION 5.13 (Stochastic better–reply process with inertia). At each time–step, each
agent acts independently and follows the (unperturbed) better–replies with inertia process
with probability 1 e(t), or uniformly samples from Ai with probability e(t).
For ﬁxed e(t) = e we again have a stationary, irreducible and aperiodic ﬁnite Markov
chain, which is, therefore, strongly ergodic; denote the transition matrix Pe, and its corre-
sponding unique stationary distribution µe, with P(ht = h) ! µ
h as t ! ¥.
The behaviour of stochastic better–replies with inertia has not been stated elsewhere to
date, but can be analysed using Theorem 4 of Young [1993].
LEMMA 5.14. The stochastically stable states of the stochastic better–reply process with
inertia with ﬁxed e in generic WABRGs are the histories consisting entirely of a single strict
Nash equilibrium.
Proof. In order to show that stochastic better–replies with inertia satisﬁes the require-
ments of Theorem 4 of Young [1993], note that it is ergodic, and in the limit as e ! 0, its
transition probabilities converge to those of the unperturbed process; that is lime!0Pe = P0.
Next, recall that if G is a generic WABRG and 0 < x < 1, then the unperturbed process con-
verges almost surely to a homogeneous state consisting of one strict Nash equilibrium of G.
Given that the stochastically stable states of stochastic better–replies with inertia are a subset
of the absorbing states of the unperturbed process, the result follows.15
Furthermore, it also follows that for any d, there exists a sufﬁciently small ﬁxed e > 0
such that limt!¥P(at is a strict Nash equilibrium) > 1 d.
With a ﬁxed e the conditions of Lemma 4.1 are satisﬁed, so we can consider a version of
better–replies with inertia using Q–learnt reward estimates.
DEFINITION 5.15 (Q–learning better–replies with inertia). At each time–step, actions
are selected according to Deﬁnition 5.13, with better–replies calculated with respect to re-
ward estimates that are updated according to 4.1 with fl(t)gt1 following (4.3) with Cl > 0
and rl 2 (1=2;1].
LEMMA 5.16. Let G be a WABRG with unknown noisy rewards and 0 < x < 1. For any
d < 0 there exists an e > 0 such that, under Q–learning better–replies with inertia with ﬁxed
e, for all sufﬁciently large t, P(at is a strict Nash equilibrium) > 1 d.
The proof of this result follows that for Lemma 5.5. However, we are not concerned
with choosing a d, since we consider decreasing e(t). We will show that a suitable schedule
implies the strong ergodicity of stochastic better–replies with inertia. Combining this result
with Lemma 5.14 gives the following:
LEMMA 5.17. Let G be a generic WABRG. Consider stochastic better–replies with iner-
tia with e(t) = ct 1=mN. If 0 < x < 1, then limt!¥P(at is a Nash equilibrium) = 1.
Note that, as before, the e schedule above necessarily satisﬁes the conditions of Lemma 4.1.
Proof. The stochastically stable states of stochastic better–replieswith inertia are a subset
of the strict Nash equilibria in WABRGs. Regarding strong ergodicity of stochastic better–
replies with inertia, since (5.7) is independent of the values of fe(t)gt1, the perturbed tran-
sition matrix for stochastic ﬁnite memory better–reply with inertia has the same properties
as that for stochastic adaptive play with respect to e, and, mutatis mutandis, the argument
for strong ergodicity is the same. The proof is completed by combining this result with
Lemma 5.16.
THEOREM 5.18. Let G be a game with unknown noisy rewards with mean rewards that
are a generic WABRG (a noisy generic WABRG). Consider Q–learning better–reply process
with inertia and e(t) = ct 1=mN. If 0 < x < 1 then limt!¥P(at is a Nash equilibrium) = 1.
Proof. Following Lemma 5.5, after an almost surely ﬁnite time T the reward estimates
will be sufﬁciently close to the true mean rewards that Q–learning better–replies with inertia
will make action selections with exactly the same probabilities as a stochastic better–replies
with inertia. Hence the result follows from Lemma 5.17.
REMARK 1. We note that a class of best–reply algorithms with inertia may be deﬁned
and analysed in a similar way to the better–reply processes above. Under these processes,
the set of best responses substitute for better replies, and convergence is guaranteed in games
that are generic and weakly acyclic under best replies.
We conclude this section with the following corollaries of Theorems 5.11 and 5.18 for
these two learning algorithms in potential games:
COROLLARY 5.19. Q–learning adaptive play and Q–learning better–replies with in-
ertia both converge to a pure Nash equilibrium in games with noisy unknown rewards with
mean rewards that are generic and admit a potential function.
5.4. Q–learning regret matching. We now consider a third class of algorithms, called
regret matching [Hart and Mas-Colell, 2000], and introduce a Q–learning regret matching
variant. Regret matching uses measures of average regret rather than expected utility to
evaluate action choices, and has a state space given by the set of joint actions A. Unlike
adaptive play and ﬁnite better reply processes with inertia, which converge to a strict Nash
equilibrium in various acyclic games, the regret matching algorithm converges in long–run
frequency of play to the set of correlated equilibria in all generic games.16
Formally, let
zt
a = 1=t
t 1
å
t=0
Ifat = ag
be the empirical frequency of play of joint action a at time t, and let zt be the vector of length
jAj containing all of the components fzt
aga2A. Denote Y the set of correlated equilibrium dis-
tributions over A (i.e. Y contains all y satisfying Deﬁnition 3.2). Regret matching generates a
sequence of distributions fztgt1 whose distance from the set Y converges to zero [Hart and
Mas-Colell, 2000].
In order to calculate its action choice probabilities, an agent, i, using regret matching,
computes the difference in its reward for switching to action a0
i every time that it played
action ai in the past. Agent i updates each zt
a in its memory using the recursion:
zt
a =
1
t
 
Ifat 1 = ag+(t  1) zt 1
a

: (5.8)
The values in zt are interpreted as agent i’s belief over the joint actions. For every pair of
actions j;k 2 Ai, the average difference in rewards for switching to k every time that j was
played is:
Dj;k(t) =
1
t
t
å
t=1
Ifat
i = jg
 
ri(k;at
 i) ri(j;at
 i)

= å
a2A
zt
aIfai = jg(ri(k;a i) ri(j;a i)):
Now let the average regret for not making the switch to k on every play of j be given by:
Rj;k(t) = maxfDj;k(t);0g: (5.9)
Finally, let:
xi  (jAij 1)max
a;a0 fjri(a)) ri(a0)jg 8 i 2 N (5.10)
be an inertial constant. Action choice probabilities are calculated as follows.
DEFINITION 5.20 (Regret matching). At each time step, zt is updated by (5.8), and the
agent computes the regret for its actions by (5.9). Then, the agent chooses an action with
probability:
P(at
i = a0
i) =
8
> <
> :
1
xiRat 1
i ;a0
i
(t); for all a0
i 6= at 1
i ;
1  1
xi å
a0
i6=at 1
i
Rai;a0
i(t) a0
i = at 1
i :
Note that the choice of x ensures that at 1
i is repeated with positive probability, and that any
other action is chosen iff it has positive regret. If all agents playing a generic game use the
procedure above, then sequence fztgt1 “approaches” the set of correlated equilibria, in the
sense of Blackwell [1956], such that as t ! ¥, P(zt 2 Y) = 1; in other words, the distribu-
tion of the empirical history of play converges to the set of correlated equilibria [Hart and
Mas-Colell, 2000]. Furthermore, for any d > 0, the algorithm enters the set of d–correlated
equilibria in a ﬁnite amount of time with probability 1.
DEFINITION 5.21 (Q–learning regret matching). Each time–step, each agent uniformly
samples from Ai with probability e(t), or follows the unperturbed regret matching dynamics
with probability 1 e(t) using reward estimates that are updated according to (4.1) in which:17
 fl(t)gt1 follows (4.3) with Cl > 0 and rl 2 (1=2;1], and
 e(t) = ct 1=N for all i 2 N.
THEOREM 5.22. Let G be a generic game with unknown noisy rewards. If Q–learning
regret matching with e(t) = ct 1=mN is used by all players, then P(limt!¥Rj;k(t) = 0) = 1;
therefore, as t ! ¥ the empirical distribution of play zt converges almost surely to the set of
correlated equilibrium distributions of the game G, that is, P(zt ! Y) = 1.
Proof sketch. They two key elements of the convergence proof of regret matching are
that: (i) by Theorem A and the associated Proposition in Hart and Mas-Colell [2000], the set
of correlated equilibria are exactly the set of distributions over joint actions with zero regret;
and (ii) the set of correlated equilibria is non-empty and compact, and therefore the set of
approximate d–correlated equilibria always has positive measure. Building on this, Hart and
Mas-Colell [2001] state three further properties of regret matching, which we use to show the
convergence of a Q–learning variant of regret matching.
First, the standard regret matching procedure does not need to be employed by the agents
from the outset of the game, so that, initially, any ﬁnite number of time–steps where play is
arbitrary could precede the use of regret matching and play would still converge to the set
of correlated equilibria. We can use this property in conjunction with Lemma 4.1 to analyse
how Q–learning regret matching behaves in games with initially unknown rewards. Specif-
ically, after an almost–surely ﬁnite time T, the reward estimates will have indistinguishable
better reply sets to the game in true mean rewards, and so will produce behaviour that is
an e–perturbation of that produced by the true mean rewards (it is perturbed by the small
differences in the true and estimated rewards on the probabilities in Deﬁnition 5.20). Thus,
after this time we can treat Q–learning regret matching as an e(t)–perturbation of standard
regret-matching, and moreover, we can treat the T time–steps required to learn the rewards
“accurately enough” as arbitrary initial play; all time steps subsequently discussed are beyond
this T.
Second, when the play of regret matching is perturbed by applying uniform sampling
with a ﬁxed e, all regret values approach d(e) > 0, and consequently, the historical frequency
of play, zt, approaches a d(e)–correlated equilibrium. Furthermore, for different ﬁxed values
of e, this distance d(e) ! 0 as e ! 0. Thus, in Q–learning regret matching, if from time t
the sampling purturbation is ﬁxed so that e(t +w) = e(t), then the process will converge to a
d(e(t))–correlated equilibrium, as in the standard procedure.
Third, with a decreasing e, the set that standard regret matching approaches can be
“shrunk” as e(t) ! 0. This is shown by considering the approachable regret value d(e(t))
and its associate approximate correlated equilibria for a large–enough block of transitions
t +w, then resetting d(e(t +w)), and so on.
Indeed, this is actually the same technique employed in the convergence proof for the
standard, unperturbed regret matching proceedure [Hart and Mas-Colell, 2000]. Speciﬁcally,
in that proof, the action transition probabilities over a block of time-steps from t to t +w are
approximated with the wth power of the transition matrix at t (i.e. a stationary process). Re-
grets in the approximating process are shown to move towards zero over the block’s duration.
Using a judicious choice of w, the difference between the approximation and the true process
is shown to vanish as, at each reset of the block length, botht and w go to ¥. In this step of the
proof, the presence of inertia in the players choice plays a key role, as the transition matrix
always has strictly positive diagonal elements; the same holds for process like Q–learning
regret matching with vanishing purturbations. Now, repeatedly applying the approximating
process shows that the regrets approach zero as t ! ¥, and because the difference between
the approximate and true processes can be shown to vanish, the true regrets also approach
zero. Since the set of correlated equilibria are equivalent to the of set distributions over joint18
actions with no positive regret, the historical frequency of play of the process converges to
the set of correlated equilibria. 
6. Experimental validation. We now validate our theoretical results by comparing our
algorithms’ performances to other algorithms proposed for games with noisy rewards. In do-
ing so, we investigate three different learning policies employed by the agents, which repre-
sent three different orders of magnitude on the rate at which the sampling probability anneals
to zero. These three settings correspond to satisfying both the Q–learning and weak ergod-
icity conditions (Lemma 4.1 and Theorem 5.11 or 5.18), only the Q–learning convergence
conditions (i.e. only Lemma 4.1), or neither condition. This is done in order to directly ex-
amine the usefulness of our theoretical understanding of how the algorithms explore action
space, update their reward estimates and adapt their actions. Thus, the empirical results in
this section are used to highlight the practical consequences of our algorithms’ theoretical
properties, in contrast to the benchmark algorithms’ performances, rather than to explicitly
evaluate the performance of various parameter settings.
6.1. Algorithms and benchmarks. We demonstrate adaptive play with memory length
8 and sample size 2 (AP(8,2)), better–replies with inertia using memory length 3 and x = 0:3
(BRI(3,0.3)), and regret matching (RM). We choose the memory lengths for APand BRI so
that the effect of these values on the decay of the sampling probability can be observed. The
inertia for BRI is chosen as it represents the middle of a region of relative equal performance,
ranging from 0:1 to 0:5. For RM, x is set to satisfy (5.10), so it has no free parameters. For all
the three algorithms, the sampling probabilities were e(t)= 1=8t 1=Nm for all i2N. We use the
same Q–learning parameters for all algorithms and benchmarks throughout the experiments,
with rl = 1 and cl = 0. We obtain similar results to those presented here for a range of
conﬁgurations of these three algorithms.
We compare these algorithms to six benchmarks. In the following, the sufﬁx “-A” means
that the algorithm uses the e–greedy policy with the schedule e(t) = 1=8t 1=N, which satisﬁes
Lemma 4.1 (Q–value convergence), but does not satisfy our conditions guaranteeing weak
ergodicity. The sufﬁx “-B” means that the algorithm uses a Boltzmann learning policy:
P(at
i = a0
i) =
eQ t
i (a0
i;z i)=h(t)
åai2Ai eQ t
i (ai;z i)=h(t)
with the temperature parameter following h(t) = 16(0:9t). This learning policy does not
satisfy Lemma 4.1, so the the Q–values are not guaranteed to converge.
Two of the benchmarks are variants of BRI with the different sampling schedules, BRI-A
and BRI-B. We examine these to directly test the effect of violating either the conditions for
weak ergodicity or Q–value convergence.
The next two benchmarks are variants of the joint action learner (JAL) of Claus and
Boutilier [1998], which is based on standard ﬁctitious play (as discussed in Section 2). The
JALbenchmarksuseabeliefupdateverysimilartothatofRM,exceptthatanagentseparately
stores each other agents’ joint action frequencies; that is, i updates each zj; j 6= i individually.
As in our algorithms, the agents use Q–learning to estimate the rewards from each joint ac-
tion, as in (4.1). Then, the expected value of i’s action, Q t
i (ai;z i), given its (joint) beliefs
z i, is computed by (3.1), where the Q t
i takes the place of ri and (ai;z i) that of s. The spe-
ciﬁc variants are called JAL-A and JAL-B and use the sampling schedules described above.
Indeed, the schedule that h(t) follows under JAL-B is chosen because it is the one used by
Claus and Boutilier [1998] in their original JAL description.
The ﬁnal two benchmarks are independent action learners (IAL-A and IAL-B), under
which agents use Q–learning to estimate the their rewards for their own actions, oblivious to19
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Colin Colin
Left Right Left Right
Rowena Up (5,5,5) (0,1,0) (0,0,1) (1,0,0)
Down (1,0,0) (0,0,1) (0,1,0) (2,2,2)
Fig. 1: Three–player potential game.
others’ actions [Claus and Boutilier, 1998; Cominetti et al., 2010]. We investigate these two
to demonstrate the effect of ignoring other agents in games with unknown noisy rewards. If
the reward distributions were stationary or the setting was a single–agent learning problem,
then the sampling schedule for IAL-A would converge slower than is necessary for the reward
estimates to converge to their true values. However, an agent’s rewards may well be nonsta-
tionary (as a result of other players changing their actions), and we wish to test if this schedule
can account for any nonstationarity. In IAL-B, proposed by Claus and Boutilier [1998] at the
same time as JAL-B, the sampling probability is driven to zero relatively quickly.
6.2. Test problem and results. We compare the algorithms in a three–player two–
action potential game, so that their behaviours can be clearly contrasted and their differences
can be transparently analysed, without complications from a complex game setting. Mean
rewards for the game are given in Figure 1, in which Rowena selects the row, Colin the col-
umn and Matt the matrix. The agents receive rewards equal to these values plus uniform
noise e 2 [ ¯ e; ¯ e], as in Equation 3.2, where ¯ e itself is uniformly drawn from [5;10] at the
beginning of each scenario. The game in mean rewards has two strict Nash equilibria. The
Nash equilibrium located at (U, L, L) is globally optimal, while the other at (D, R, R) is sub-
optimal; the same number and length of best response paths lead to each one. The metric of
interest is the probability of converging to different Nash equilibria, and the mean frequencies
of convergence to each equilibrium by the algorithms were recorded for 50 repetitions of 50
scenarios, generated randomly as described above. We consider a duration of 800 time–steps,
not because all algorithms converge in this time, but because most interesting behaviour oc-
curs during this period and the clearest differentiations can be made. Since the algorithms are
only guaranteed to converge to a strict Nash equilibrium, and not necessarily to the optimum,
we also use this game to informally investigate the quality of their solutions.
The results are given in the plots in Figure 2, which illustrate the proportion of play is the
optimal Nash equilibrium (dark), suboptimal Nash equilibrium (light) or a non–equilibrium
outcome (medium) is played, over time (standard errors were too small to plot). The bold
dashed or dotted lines on the plots show the same proportions for the agents’ intended play;
that is, the actions given by following their unperturbed dynamics, rather than sampling
(e.g. with probability e(t)), at that time–step. The distance between the actual and intended
play of a Nash equilibrium gives the proportion of non–equilibrium play that is due to the
sampling induced by the learning policy.
ResultsforourthreenovelalgorithmsareonthetoprowofFigure2. Themostnoticeable
feature is that AP, BRI and RM all converge towards a Nash equilibrium in a high proportion
of simulations: 83%, 86% and 83% of actual play att =800, respectively, and more than 96%
of intended play for both AP and BRI, and 90% for RM. These very high proportions validate
our convergence results for these algorithms. Additionally, the proportion of the globally
optimal play is high, at greater than 80% for all three. Compared to BRI, the (slightly) lower
proportion converged to equilibrium for AP is expected, as the e schedule goes to zero more
slowly because of its longer memory. The relatively lower proportion for RM is expected
because it converges to the set of correlated equilibria, which are a superset of the Nash
equilibria. A fairer measurement of the convergence of RM is the proportion of runs in which
it ﬁnds a correlated equilibrium; analysis of the results show that RM is within 1% of the20
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Fig. 2: Action proportions over time, showing the optimal, suboptimal and non–Nash equi-
librium play, and intended play (without sampling) superimposed.
payoff of a correlated equilibrium over the period t = 600 to 800 in more than 95% of runs.
This is consistent with convergence to an approximate correlated equilibrium, and validates
our convergence results for RM.
The remaining 6 plots regard benchmarks. The results for JAL-A and BRI-A are particu-
larly interesting, since they show almost as good performance as that of our algorithms. The
-A sampling schedule satisﬁes Lemma 4.1, so the algorithms’ Q–values should converge.
This seems to be sufﬁcient for JAL-A to converge (recalling that ﬁctitious play converges to a
Nash equilibrium in potential games), although it does converge to the optimal Nash equilib-
rium in only 76% of runs, which is signiﬁcantly less often than AP, BRI or RM. On the other
hand, the convergence of BRI-A may be a result of the game in question admitting a more
compact reduction in the states over which its weak ergodicity can be shown (as noted in the
discussion of weak ergodicity in Lemma 5.6); however, this could not have been known to
the agents before they began to play the game.
Regarding JAL-B and BRI-B, the fact that the Q–values do not converge under the -B
sampling schedule is illustrated in their quick “freezing” into ﬁxed proportions of play, with
actual and intended play taking almost the same values. This is because they become mired
with incorrect reward estimates in non–equilibrium outcomes, and do not sample new actions
frequently enough to learn the true better replies in the game. Even though the algorithms
do reach Nash equilibrium outcomes in a good proportion of runs (approximately 92% and21
96%, respectively), a set of simulations with a duration of 2500 time–steps showed that these
proportions do not improved noticeably beyond these levels.
Finally, both IAL variants suffer from not incorporating the actions of other agents. IAL-
A does, in fact, continue to improve its proportion of Nash equilibrium convergence over
the longer term: After 2500 time–steps it had a total Nash–converged proportion similar to
JAL-B over the same time, and over 10,000 time–steps, it had further reduced this to about
97%, which is comparable to the intended play of AP, BRI and RM, albeit over an order
of magnitude longer duration. Nonetheless, the -A sampling schedule does appear to be
sufﬁcient for its Q–values to eventually converge. On the other hand, JAL-B freezes into
ﬁxed proportions of play within 100 time–steps at a very low proportion of Nash equilibrium
convergence (< 60%), and does not improve over longer durations.
These benchmark results are consistent with our theoretical analysis, and correspond
with our understanding of the conditions under which the algorithms should converge. In
particular, the fact that, by Lemma 4.1, the -A schedule is sufﬁcient for the Q–values to
converge appears to enable the algorithms not directly covered by our theoretical results to
perform well. In contrast, the -B schedule is not sufﬁcient for the convergence of reward esti-
mates, which prevents the associated algorithms from converging. Collectively these results
indicate that accurate learning of rewards, coupled with principled reasoning over and ap-
propriate responses to opponents’ actions, are sufﬁcient to drive convergence to equilibrium
in practice. On the other hand, dropping either Q–value convergence (i.e. using schedule
-B) or explicit reasoning over opponent actions (as in the IAL variants) prevent play from
converging at an acceptable rate.
7. Conclusions. In this paper, we proved the convergence to Nash equilibria of variants
of adaptive play and the better–reply processes in potential games and other more general
acyclic games with rewards that are initially unknown and which must be estimated over
time from noisy observations. We also derived a Q–learning variant of regret matching, and
proved its almost sure converge to the set of correlated equilibria. Finally, the necessity of the
conditions on the algorithms’ sampling rates that we derived were empirically veriﬁed. Our
results guarantee the convergence of several distributed optimisation methods, for settings
where reward functions cannot be prespeciﬁed and that have constraints on communication
between system components.
There are a number of ways in which this work may be taken forward. One particularly
interesting direction is to put ﬁnite–time bounds on the algorithms’ performance, by employ-
ing different frameworks for analysing online learning of noisy rewards and the consequent
convergence of an algorithm to Nash equilibrium, such as PAC or KWIK learning [Valiant,
1984; Li et al., 2008]. A second opportunity is to extend the convergence of the algorithms to
more complicated settings, and, in particular, we are interested in settings where the payoffs
in the game vary according to some state variable, such as is addressed for individual agents
in the growing literature on contextual multi–armed bandits and multi–armed bandits with
co-variates [Lu et al., 2010].
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Appendix A. In Section 4 we investigated a scenario where the individuals attempt to estimate
their expected reward ri(a) for each joint action in A. However, in the standard normal form consid-
ered to date, the joint action space A grows exponentially with the number of agents, so this estimation
problem becomes impractical. However in systems with an inherent structure, such as those with a nat-
ural spatial structure in which interaction only directly occurs between geographically close individuals,
agents should only need to consider the actions of their neighbours. We now show that, if a game admits
a compact form, then this representation can be exploited to improve the agents’ learning rates, for two
compact forms.
This ﬁrst is graphical normal form (GNF), which can represent games in which some agents’
rewards are independent of others’ strategies [Kearns et al., 2001]. In this form, the nodes of a graph
correspond to the set of agents, while edges connect an agent to the others with which it shares a reward
dependency, called its neighbours. The neighbourhood of i is the smallest set ni of players such that
agent i’s reward is entirely determined by ai and faj : j 2nig. We say an undirected reward dependency
exists between i and j(6= i) if either j 2 ni or i 2 nj.
DEFINITION A.1. A game in GNF comprises a set of agents located on the nodes of a graph. An
agent is connected to those with which it shares an undirected reward dependency, which includes its set
of neighbours ni  N. Its reward function, ri(ai;ni), is then given by an array indexed by tuples from the
set j2fi;nigjAjj. Games in GNF with unknown noisy rewards are deﬁned similarly, with the difference
being that when the joint action a 2 A is played, agent i receives the reward
Ri = ri(ai;ani)+ei; (A.1)
where ri(ai;ani) is the true expected reward to agent i for the joint action (ai;ani), and ei is a random
variable with zero mean and bounded variance.
NotethatinGNF,ri(a)dependsonlyonai andani, whereani isthejointactionofalltheneighbours
of i. Subsequently, we write ri as a function of the joint actions of i and its neighbours, that is, ri(ai;ni).
Also, note that games in standard normal form can be represented in GNF with a complete graph.
For games in GNF, each agent needs to learn only its rewards over it and its neighbours’ joint action
spaces, given by: Ai;ni = Aij2ni Aj. For large games, this is a much more feasible task than estimating
the full reward function on A. Each individual i now updates its estimates Qt
i using the equation:
Qt+1
i (ai;ni) = Qt
i(ai;ni)+l(t)Ifat
i;ni = ai;nig
 
Rt
i  Qt
i(ai;ni)

8ai;ni 2 Ai;ni: (A.2)
In this case, the sequence fe(t)gt!¥ can be altered to take advantage of the reduced size of each agent’s
joint action space, while still ensuring that each Q–value is updated inﬁnitely often.24
LEMMA A.2. In a game in GNF, let i’s neighbourhood size be the number of neighbours of i plus
1 for i itself. Given this, let Ji be the size of the largest of the neighbourhoods of i or any j in ni. In a
game with unknown noisy rewards, if agents select their actions using a policy in which, for all i 2 N,
ai 2 Ai and t  1,
P(at
i = ai)  ei(t); with ei(t) = cet 1=Ji;
where ce > 0 is a positive constant, then 8i 2 N, 8ai;ni 2 Ai;ni:
lim
t!¥
jQt
i(ai;ni) ri(ai;ni)j = 0 with probability 1. (A.3)
Proof. If P(at
i = ai)  cet 1=Ji, then 8ai;ni 2 Ai;ni, a lower bound on P(at
i;ni = ai;ni) is:
Õ
j2fig[ni
cet 1=Jj 

cet 1=(jnij+1)
jnij+1
= (ce)jnij+1t 1;
because Jj  jnij+1. The result follows from observing that å¥
t=0(ce)jnij+1t 1 = ¥ within each neigh-
bourhood’s joint action space Ai;ni.
The second useful compact representation is hypergraphical normal form (HNF) [Gottlob et al.,
2005; Papadimitriou and Roughgarden, 2008], which comprises hyperedges representing a set of local
games that each contain several agents. An agent is typically involved in more than one local game, and
its neighbours are those it is linked to via any local game.
DEFINITION A.3. A game in HNF comprises a set of agents located on the nodes of a hypergraph.
Each hyperedge represents a local game: G = fg1;g2;:::g, where g = hNg;fAi;ri;ggi2Ngi, deﬁned as
in SNF. Let Gi = fg : i 2 Ngg be the set of local games containing agent i. Player i’s action set, Ai,
is identical in all g 2 Gi, and it selects a single action ai 2 Ai to play in all of its local games. Its
neighbours in g 2 Gi are ni;g = Ng ni, and its reward from g, ri;g(ag) is given by an array indexed by
tuples from the set j2NgjAjj. Its full set of neighbours is given by ni = [g2GiNg ni, and its reward is
the sum of its rewards from g 2 Gi: ri(ai;ai;ni) = åg2Gi ri;g(ai;ani;g), where ani;g is the joint action of i0s
neighbours in g. For games in HNF with unknown noisy rewards, when the joint action a 2 A is played,
agent i receives the (independently observable) rewards
Ri;g = ri;g(ag)+ei;g 8g 2 Gi; (A.4)
where ri;g(ag) is the true expected reward to agent i from local game g for the joint action ag, and each
ei;g is a random variable with zero mean and bounded variance.
Again, since ri(a) now only depends on ai and ani, we write ri(ai;ni). Any games in standard
normal form can be represented in HNF with a single local game g.
In a game in HNF, each agent can learn the payoffs for joint actions in each of its local games
independently. Hence, an individual i now updates its estimate Qt
i;g of its reward function for each g
using the equation:
Qt+1
i;g (ag) = Qt
i;g(ag)+l(t)Ifat
g = agg

Rt
i;g Qt
i;g(ag)

8ag 2 Ag: (A.5)
For games in HNF, each joint action in each local game is guaranteed to be sampled inﬁnitely often by
following the fe(t)gt!¥ schedule given in the following Lemma.
LEMMA A.4. In a game in HNF, let Ji be the maximum number of participants in any single local
game in Gi (i.e. Ji =maxg2Gi jNgj). In a game with unknown noisy rewards, if agents select their actions
using a policy in which, for all i 2 N, ai 2 Ai and t  1,
P(at
i = ai)  ei(t); with ei(t) = cet 1=Ji;
where ce > 0 is a positive constant, then
lim
t!¥
jQt
i;g(ag) ri;g(ag)j = 0 with probability 1, 8i 2 N; 8g 2 Gi; 8ag 2 Ag: (A.6)25
The proof follows identically that of Lemma A.2 but with the appropriate deﬁnition of Ji for HNF, and
by observing that å¥
t=0(ce)jnij+1t 1 = ¥ within each local game’s joint action space Ag.
We have now derived techniques for estimating an agent’s reward functions that can overcome
the computational problems associated with learning rewards in large games by exploiting structured
interaction between the agents. When interleaved with a suitable strategy adaptation process, this will
result in an algorithm that learns all rewards accurately and converges to equilibrium in games with
unknown noisy rewards.
DEFINITION A.5 (Compact Q–learning variants). Each of compact Q–learning adaptive play,
better–replies with inertia, and regret matching is deﬁned as their non–compact counterparts (i.e. Def-
initions 5.4, 5.15 and 5.21), but with ei(t) = ct 1=Jidm=2e, where Ji is the neighbourhood size as deﬁned
in GNF or HNF.
COROLLARY A.6. Let G be a game with unknown noisy rewards:
 If G has mean rewards that are weakly acyclic under best replies (WAG), then if k  m=(LG+
2) compact Q–learning adaptive play almost surely converges in round–by–round behaviour
to a pure Nash equilibrium in G.
 If G has mean rewards that are weakly acyclic under better replies (WABRG), then compact
Q–learning better–replies with inertia almost surely converges in round–by–round behaviour
to a pure Nash equilibrium in G.
Moreover, compact Q–learning adaptive play and Q–learning better–replies with inertia all converge
to a pure Nash equilibrium in games with noisy unknown rewards with mean rewards that are generic
and admit a potential function. Finally, if G has mean rewards that are generic, then compact Q–
learning regret matching almost surely converges in round–by–round behaviour to a correlated equilib-
rium in G.